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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.  
A jury found Appellee Francis Raia guilty of conspiracy to 
bribe voters.  At sentencing, the District Court calculated 
Raia’s total offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines to 
be 14, which with Raia’s criminal history category yielded a 
Guidelines range of 15–21 months’ imprisonment.  The Court 
then stated it would vary to offense level 8—zero to six 
months—and sentenced Raia to a three-month term of 
imprisonment.  The Government appeals the sentence claiming 
procedural error, arguing that the District Court miscalculated 
the Guidelines offense level by not applying two sentencing 
enhancements: a four-level aggravating role enhancement 
under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) and a two-level obstruction of 
justice enhancement under § 3C1.1.   
Because the District Court erred in its interpretation of the 
Guidelines, we will vacate the sentence and remand for 
resentencing.  The Government requests that we remand with 
instructions that the District Court apply both the four-level 
aggravating role enhancement and the two-level obstruction of 
justice enhancement.  But because the record does not clearly 
support the application of either enhancement, we will leave it 
to the District Court to make whatever factual findings are 




I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Indictment 
In 2013, Raia ran for election to a city council seat in 
Hoboken, New Jersey.  In that same election, Raia also 
supported—through a political action committee (“PAC”) he 
chaired—a ballot referendum to weaken local rent control 
laws.  Raia’s campaign strategy was to solicit voters residing 
in the Hoboken Housing Authority to vote by mail.  To that 
end, Raia’s PAC cut $50 checks to hundreds of these voters.  
Raia claimed that the voters who received the $50 did so in 
exchange for get-out-the-vote work they did for Raia’s 
campaign, such as wearing campaign-branded t-shirts and 
handing out campaign literature.  Raia lost the election.  
An investigation supported a different reason for Raia’s 
campaign’s vote-by-mail strategy and his PAC’s use of $50 
checks: voters were paid in exchange for casting their mail-in 
ballots in favor of Raia’s slate and the rent control referendum.  
In short, the Government believes that “Raia instructed his 
campaign workers—including [1] Matthew Calicchio, [2] 
Michael Holmes, [3] Freddie Frazier, [4] Lizaida Camis, [5] 
Dio Braxton, and [6] Ana Cintron”—to bribe voters.  Gov’t Br. 
3.  Under the Government’s version of events, Raia directed 
his campaign workers to collect and bring back unsealed mail-
in ballots to his club in Hoboken so that he could verify 
whether each bribed voter cast his or her ballot as directed 
before having a $50 check issued to the voter from his PAC.  
To conceal the nature of the bribes, Raia created a cover story 
that each voter who received a $50 check did get-out-the-vote 
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work for Raia’s campaign, and he made each voter sign a 
declaration to support that narrative. 
On October 31, 2018, Raia and co-defendant Braxton were 
charged with one count of conspiracy to commit an offense 
against the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, with 
the underlying offense being the use of the mails to facilitate 
any “unlawful activity” in violation of the Travel Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).  The Travel Act defines “unlawful 
activity” to include state bribery offenses.  See § 1952(b)(2).  
Paying for votes is illegal bribery under New Jersey law.  See 
N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:27-2(a) and 19:34-25(a). 
By the time of Raia’s trial in June 2019, most of his co-
conspirators had reached agreements with the Government.  
Camis pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to a 
separate indictment on November 8, 2018.  Calicchio pleaded 
guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to an information against 
him on May 7, 2019.  Raia’s co-defendant Braxton pleaded 
guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, on May 30, 2019.  
Holmes, Frazier, and Cintron were not charged.  Holmes and 
Frazier each entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the 
Government. 
B. Trial 
A jury trial was held before Judge Martini in the District of 
New Jersey.  The Government called, among other witnesses, 
Calicchio, Holmes, and Frazier.  Each testified that Raia 
directed himself and others, including the three non-testifying 
co-conspirators, to bribe voters.   
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Raia took the stand in his own defense.  The gist of Raia’s 
testimony, and overall defense theory, was that the campaign 
workers acted independently to bribe voters without any 
direction from Raia, and that the cooperating witnesses’ 
testimony to the contrary were just lies told to stay on the good 
side of Government prosecutors.  Under oath, Raia testified, 
among other things, that he “never bought a vote in [his] life” 
and that he did not instruct Camis, Cintron, or Braxton to bribe 
voters.  App. 753; see App. 737–41.     
The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to the one count of 
conspiracy charged and made no special findings.   
C. Sentencing 
Judge Martini held a sentencing hearing on December 2, 
2019.  We summarize the District Court’s rulings on each 
enhancement the Government sought to apply before turning 
to the rulings on Raia’s motion for a downward departure or 
variance. 
1. Aggravating Role Enhancement 
The Government, in accord with the Probation Office’s 
recommendation in the Presentence Investigation Report, 
argued that a four-level aggravating enhancement under 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) applied because Raia was an “organizer 
or leader” of the voter bribery scheme and the scheme involved 
five or more participants.  The District Court stated that 
applying the four-level enhancement would be “extreme” and 
noted there was no testimony at trial that Raia ever imposed 
consequences on his campaign workers for not following his 
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directives to bribe voters.  App. 1092.  Raia had advanced this 
same “no consequences” theory in his sentencing 
memorandum, arguing that without any evidence of threatened 
consequences for disobedience he could not be an “organizer, 
leader, manager or supervisor” of another person, and thus no 
enhancement under § 3B1.1 was applicable.  See App. 1019–
21 (citing United States v. DeGovanni, 104 F.3d 43, 45–46 (3d 
Cir. 1997)). 
But the District Court declined to follow Raia’s suggestion 
that no aggravating role enhancement applied.  Instead, it 
determined that the two-level aggravating role enhancement in 
subsection (c) “may be applicable” because Raia was the 
beneficiary of the conspiracy.  App. 1095; see also App. 1094 
(positing that subsection (c) “at best . . . might apply”).  The 
Court did not make any finding as to whether Raia was an 
“organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” of the conspiracy.  
Nor did it make an explicit finding as to the number of 
participants in the conspiracy.   
2. Obstruction of Justice Enhancement 
The Government also argued that a two-level obstruction 
of justice enhancement under § 3C1.1 applied because Raia 
committed perjury at trial.  “A defendant who testifies under 
oath at trial commits perjury within § 3C1.1 if he ‘[1] gives 
false testimony [2] concerning a material matter [3] with the 
willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result 
of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.’”  United States v. 
Napolitan, 762 F.3d 297, 312 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United 
States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993)).  The Government 
maintained that Raia’s testimony to the effect that he had 
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“[n]ever engaged in vote-buying or instructed particular 
campaign workers to bribe voters” was necessarily false 
because it was irreconcilable with the guilty verdict returned 
by the jury.1  App. 996, 1002–03 (Gov’t sentencing memo.).  
Raia primarily contested the falsity element, positing that the 
jury could have convicted him while believing that he did not 
instruct his campaign workers to bribe voters. 
The District Judge stated he was “not comfortable” with 
applying an obstruction of justice enhancement in Raia’s case.  
App. 1096 (Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 26:20–22).  He believed he 
was being asked to find Raia’s testimony false based on the 
testimony of the cooperating witnesses—Holmes, Frazier, and 
Calicchio.  The Court expressed hesitancy in crediting the 
testimony of the cooperating witnesses because each had either 
received a non-prosecution agreement or lied during the course 
of the proceedings, and there was no other evidence clearly 
corroborating their testimony regarding the instruction of 
campaign workers. 
The District Court ultimately declined to apply the 
obstruction of justice enhancement.  However, it did not make 
specific findings as to any of the elements of perjury—falsity, 
materiality, and willfulness. 
 
1 The Government also argued that Raia gave false testimony 
on two other points.  On appeal, the Government argues for the 
obstruction of justice enhancement based solely on Raia’s 
testimony that he did not instruct his campaign workers to 
bribe voters.  See Gov’t Br. 20–21. 
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3. Downward Departure and Variance 
In his sentencing memorandum, Raia conceded that his 
base offense level was 12, which would result in a Guidelines 
range of 10–16 months’ imprisonment.  But he sought a 
downward variance—down to a non-custodial sentence—on 
account of both his medical needs and his history of 
community service.  Raia also characterized these factors as 
justifications for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. 
§§ 5H1.4 (Physical Condition) and 5H1.11 (Charitable 
Service/Good Works).  The Government opposed any 
reduction in Raia’s sentencing exposure and asserted that Raia 
should be sentenced to 27 months’ imprisonment—the bottom 
of his Guidelines range if the total offense level were 18. 
The District Court stated that it would grant Raia’s motion 
for a downward departure based on Raia’s “extraordinary” 
charitable and public service that showed “true caring, more 
than [Judge Martini had] ever observed.”  App. 1083 
(Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 13:7–13); see also id. at 1092 (Sentencing 
Hr’g Tr. 22:1–4) (“[A]n appropriate departure will be applied 
for that conduct.”).  The Court rejected Raia’s motion for a 
departure based on his physical condition because Raia’s 
health problems were neither extraordinary nor untreatable by 
the Bureau of Prisons. 
Only after analyzing the applicability of the two 
enhancements and ruling on the departure motions did the 
District Court announce a total offense level under the 
Guidelines: 14.  The District Court then expressly considered 
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553—including Raia’s 
extraordinary community service, his physical condition, and 
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the need for general deterrence—and announced that “[f]or the 
record, I will vary down to a Level 8, Offense Level 8, which 
is a guideline of zero to six months.”  App. 1119 (Sentencing 
Hr’g Tr. 49:3–4).  The Court then sentenced Raia to a three-
month term of imprisonment with a one-year term of 
supervised release.  This appeal followed.2 
II. ANALYSIS 
The Government argues that the District Court erred in its 
calculation of Raia’s Guidelines total offense level and 
sentencing range by declining to apply a four-level aggravating 
role enhancement and a two-level obstruction of justice 
enhancement.  We review a district court’s factual findings 
relevant to Guidelines enhancements for clear error and we 
exercise plenary review over a district court’s interpretation of 
the Guidelines.  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (en banc).  We will address the applicability of each 
enhancement in turn.  Raia, in the alternative, argues that any 
errors in the Guidelines calculation were harmless because it is 
highly likely that the District Court would impose the same 
sentence under the correct Guidelines range.  We will address 
the harmless error issue after discussing the two enhancements. 
A. Aggravating Role Enhancement 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
The Government timely appealed Raia’s sentence and the 
Solicitor General approved the prosecution of the appeal.  We 




Section 3B1.1 of the Guidelines provides for an 
enhancement based on the role the defendant played in 
committing the offense.  There are three possible offense-level 
increases depending on both the responsibility of the defendant 
and the scope of the criminal activity: (a) four levels if the 
defendant was an “organizer or leader” of the criminal activity 
and the crime involved five or more participants or was 
otherwise extensive; (b) three levels if the defendant was 
merely a “manager or supervisor” not rising to the level of 
“organizer or leader” and the crime involved five or more 
participants or was otherwise extensive; and (c) two levels if 
the defendant was any one of those roles but the criminal 
activity involved fewer than five participants and was not 
otherwise extensive.  § 3B1.1(a)–(c).  The Guidelines do not 
define “organizer,” “leader,” “manager,” or “supervisor.”  
Commentary to § 3B1.1 provides a non-exhaustive list of 
seven factors that a court should consider when distinguishing 
an organizer or leader from a manager or supervisor, including 
“the recruitment of accomplices,” “the claimed right to a larger 
share of the fruits of the crime,” “the degree of participation in 
planning or organizing the offense,” and “the degree of control 
and authority exercised over others.”  Id., App. Note 4; see also 
United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 127 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(“The commentary to the guidelines of course is intended only 
to suggest various factors to be weighed.”). 
Here, the District Court applied a two-level enhancement 
under § 3B1.1(c) despite the uncontested fact that the voter 
bribery scheme involved five or more participants.  This was 
error, as the text of the Guidelines makes plain.  “A trial court’s 
only options in cases involving a criminal activity with five or 
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more participants are . . . a four-level enhancement under 
§ 3B1.1(a), a three-level enhancement under § 3B1.1(b), or no 
enhancement at all.”  United States v. Kirkeby, 11 F.3d 777, 
778–79 (8th Cir. 1993).  Raia concedes this error, arguing only 
that a one-level increase in the total offense level would be 
harmless error.  See Oral Arg. Recording at 58:42–59:19.  For 
reasons discussed infra Section II.C, we are not persuaded by 
Raia’s arguments of harmless error.  So we will vacate Raia’s 
sentence and remand for resentencing. 
Still, the Government seeks more than just a do-over.  It 
asks that our remand include instructions that the District Court 
apply the four-level aggravating role enhancement under 
§ 3B1.1(a).  We decline to cabin the District Court’s further 
consideration in that manner as it is not clear that “‘the record 
permits only one resolution of the factual issue.’” Bedrosian v. 
I.R.S., 912 F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Sprint/United 
Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 387 n.3 (2008)).   
For the aggravating role enhancement to apply, “the 
evidence must show that [the defendant] exercised some 
degree of control over at least one other person involved in the 
offense.”  United States v. Fountain, 792 F.3d 310, 321 (3d Cir. 
2015) (citing United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 243–44 
(3d Cir. 2000)).  But once it is established that the defendant 
exercised some degree of control over another, the sentencing 
court must still determine whether the defendant was merely a 
“manager or supervisor”—meriting a three-level enhancement 
where, as here, the criminal activity involved five or more 




The record before us does not point to only one 
determination of Raia’s role in the offense.  This is 
unsurprising given that the inquiry into a defendant’s role 
involves weighing numerous factors.  Here, however, there 
was a dearth of findings by the District Court.3  The District 
 
3 Oddly, both parties suggest that by imposing the two-level 
enhancement, the District Court implicitly found that Raia was 
a “manager or supervisor” but not an “organizer or leader.”  
The application of the two-level enhancement does not support 
such an implicit finding because the enhancement applies to a 
defendant who was “an organizer, leader, manager, or 
supervisor” of a non-extensive criminal activity.  § 3B1.1(c).  
The parties theorize, roughly, that the District Court must have 
found Raia to be a “manager or supervisor” but erroneously 
went “down” one level too far to the two-level enhancement, 
possibly because it viewed Raia as having exercised a small 
degree of control over others.  But the District Court’s 
references to control do not foreclose other possibilities.  
Perhaps the Court found Raia to be an “organizer or leader” on 
the balance of factors but (erroneously) applied only a two-
level enhancement because the control factor was particularly 
weak.  Or perhaps the Court thought Raia was not even a 
“manager or supervisor” (meriting no enhancement) because 
there was no “evidence that . . . he was the boss saying to 
people: You have to go do this,” but applied a two-level 
enhancement because Raia was the beneficiary of the 
conspiracy (which would also be an error).  App. 1094 
(Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 23:17–18); see id. at 1095 (“[L]ook – he 
was the beneficiary of this conspiracy.”).  This indeterminacy 
prevents us from concluding that the District Court made an 
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Court did find that there was no “evidence that . . . [Raia] was 
the boss saying to people: You have to go do this”—a finding 
which the Government argues is contradicted by the jury 
verdict.  App. 1094 (Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 23:17–18).  But 
whether Raia issued instructions to campaign workers to bribe 
voters is not dispositive.  Looking, for example, to some of the 
factors in the Guidelines commentary, there is no finding as to 
who recruited the co-conspirators into the voter bribery 
scheme, nor is there a finding as to Raia’s degree of planning 
the scheme.  It is true that “[t]here need not be evidence of 
every factor before a defendant is found to be a ‘leader or 
organizer.’” Ortiz, 878 F.2d at 127.  But the record here is not 
developed enough to enable us to determine that in the first 
instance. 
On remand, the District Court should make explicit 
findings as to the number of participants in the criminal activity 
and whether Raia exercised some degree of control over 
another participant.  The Court should then make a finding as 
to whether Raia was an “organizer or leader” or a mere 
“manager or supervisor” of the criminal activity, weighing all 
relevant factors as appropriate. 
B. Obstruction of Justice Enhancement 
In United States v. Dunnigan, the Supreme Court held that 
whenever a defendant challenges the application of a § 3C1.1 
enhancement based on perjured testimony, “the trial court must 
make findings to support all the elements of a perjury violation 
 
implicit finding that Raia was a “manager or supervisor” but 
not an “organizer or leader.” 
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in the specific case.”  507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993).  We have held 
that this Dunnigan rule is “not implicated when the 
enhancement is being rejected.” Napolitan, 762 F.3d at 314.  
Nevertheless, a reasoned and rational justification is necessary 
to facilitate meaningful appellate review.  Id.  So, in Napolitan 
we exercised our supervisory power to hold that a district court 
must make the same explicit factual findings as to each element 
of perjury when the Government seeks to have the 
enhancement applied and the district court declines to apply it.  
762 F.3d at 314–15.   
Here, the District Court declined, over the Government’s 
objection, to apply the enhancement under § 3C1.1.  Yet, 
despite Raia’s suggestion to the contrary, the District Court did 
not clearly express which elements of perjury the Government 
had failed to prove.  While Raia is correct that the Court’s 
discussion of the enhancement was longer than the single 
sentence at issue in Napolitan, 762 F.3d at 312 (“I don’t know 
that the record supports it”), the Court did not even mention the 
specific elements of perjury.  In declining to apply the 
obstruction of justice enhancement, it did indeed state that 
there was no email4 “directly contradictory” to Raia’s 
 
4 The Government makes much of the District Court’s 
reference to a lack of corroborating evidence, claiming that the 
Court “imposed a corroboration requirement” not found in the 
Guidelines.  Gov’t Br. 24.  We see no such imposition.  While 
there is no requirement in § 3C1.1 that the falsity of a 
defendant’s testimony be corroborated by documentary 
evidence or other testimony, the Court remained free to 
consider the existence of corroborating evidence in 
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testimony, which suggests that falsity was an unproven 
element.  App. 1096.  But it is not clear from the record that 
the Court declined to apply the enhancement because a 
preponderance of the evidence failed to show that Raia made 
false statements, or, instead, because it was “not comfortable” 
applying a two-level enhancement for policy reasons.  App. 
1096.  (The latter would be a procedural error.  See Napolitan, 
762 F.3d at 312–13, 315 (holding the enhancement must be 
applied if the elements of perjury are satisfied notwithstanding 
policy concern regarding the right of a defendant to testify in 
his defense).) 
Because the District Court did not make explicit findings as 
to the elements of perjury, we cannot fulfill our obligation to 
meaningfully review the determination of Raia’s offense level 
under the Guidelines.  This requires us to remand.  And, as 
discussed infra Section II.C, a two-level miscalculation of the 
Guidelines offense level would not be a harmless error. 
Here too, the Government seeks more than a remand for 
sufficient findings.  It asks that we remand with instructions 
that the District Court apply the enhancement because all the 
elements of perjury are clear from the record.  As an initial 
matter, this remedy would be unusual regardless of the record’s 
clarity.  The Government points us to no precedential case—
nor could we find one—where our Court directed that an 
obstruction of justice enhancement be applied when the district 
court did not apply the enhancement.  See Oral Arg. Recording 
at 6:11–7:13 (citing United States v. Yaniro, 303 F. App’x 100, 
 
determining whether Raia’s testimony was false by a 
preponderance of evidence. 
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103–04 (3d Cir. 2008) (not precedential) (affirming district 
court’s application of the enhancement for perjury based on 
defendant’s testimony at trial when district court erroneously 
applied enhancement for defendant’s post-arrest statements)). 
Substantively, the Government’s argument for falsity relies 
entirely on the jury’s guilty verdict.  In evaluating whether a 
defendant’s testimony is false, “‘the sentencing court [is 
bound] to accept the facts necessarily implicit in the verdict.’” 
Napolitan, 762 F.3d at 315 (quoting United States v. Boggi, 74 
F.3d 470, 479 (3d Cir. 1996)).  The Government argues that 
the jury’s guilty verdict implies that Raia instructed his 
campaign workers to bribe voters, so his testimony to the 
contrary was necessarily false. 
“When a case involves a general verdict, establishing that 
the verdict necessarily determined any particular issue is 
extremely difficult.”  United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270, 282 
(7th Cir. 1992), cited by United States v. McLaughlin, 126 F.3d 
130, 138 (3d Cir. 1997).  Our cases affirming the application 
of the obstruction of justice enhancement for perjury based on 
facts implicit in a guilty verdict have involved testimony that 
all but stated an element of the offense.  For example, in United 
States v. Gray, we affirmed the application of an enhancement 
for perjury when the defendant “repeatedly testified that he did 
not have a gun” but was convicted of unlawful possession of a 
firearm by a felon.  942 F.3d 627, 630, 632–33 (3d Cir. 2019).  
It is a logical implication that a defendant who testified that he 
did not possess something but who is then convicted of 
possession of that thing lied on the stand.  See also United 
States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 144, 153–54 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(enhancement not clearly erroneous for defendant convicted of 
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possession with intent to distribute drugs when defendant 
testified that “none of the drugs found in his coat, in the taxi, 
and in the bags in [woman’s] bedroom belonged to him”); 
Boggi, 74 F.3d at 479 (enhancement not clearly erroneous for 
defendant union representative convicted of, inter alia, 
unlawful receipt of money or thing of value by a union official 
in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 186 where defendant on the witness 
stand “deni[ed] acceptance or extortion of money and other 
things of value.”). 
But Raia was charged with conspiracy to commit voter 
bribery, not simple possession.  The jury was instructed that 
the Government had to prove the existence of an agreement to 
achieve the object of the conspiracy, but that the agreement or 
mutual understanding could have been spoken or unspoken.  
App. 903.  And the jury was instructed that the Government 
did not have to prove that Raia himself committed any overt 
acts to further the conspiracy.  App. 906.  In other words, the 
jury did not need to believe that Raia instructed his campaign 
workers to bribe voters in order to find him guilty of 
conspiracy.  For example, the jury could have found Raia 
guilty of conspiracy for tacitly agreeing to further the 
conspiracy without telling the campaign workers to bribe 
voters. 
 The Government’s rejoinder is that although the jury 
logically could have found Raia guilty without believing that 
he instructed campaign workers to bribe voters, neither the 
Government nor Raia asked the jury to so finely parse the 
evidence.  Instead, the case was tried to the jury as a binary 
choice: believe either the Government’s witnesses or Raia.  So, 
since the jury found Raia guilty, it must have believed the 
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Government’s account.  Yet a jury is always free to believe 
only part of a defendant’s testimony.  See, e.g., App. 913 (jury 
instructions) (“You may believe everything a witness says or 
only a part of it or none of it.”).  A general verdict does “not 
disclose whether the jury rejected all or only part of 
[defendant’s] testimony.”  McLaughlin, 126 F.3d at 140 n.11.  
Whether a fact is “necessarily implicit in the verdict” is a 
different inquiry from determining which facts the jury most 
likely believed. 
Because the fact that Raia instructed his campaign workers 
to bribe voters is not necessarily implicit in the verdict, we 
cannot say that Raia’s testimony was false.  We will not, 
therefore, direct the application of the obstruction of justice 
enhancement.5  On remand, the Government may attempt to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Raia instructed 
campaign workers to bribe voters—or any other fact contrary 
to his testimony—with testimonial or documentary evidence. 
C. Harmless Error 
The District Court committed multiple errors in the 
calculation of the Guidelines offense level that normally 
warrant a remand for resentencing.  Yet Raia submits that any 
errors committed by the District Court are harmless in light of 
the three-month sentence imposed.  Procedural errors at 
sentencing—including miscalculations of the Guidelines—are 
 
5 Because we hold that the verdict here does not necessarily 
imply that Raia’s testimony regarding instruction of campaign 




indeed subject to harmless error review.  See United States v. 
Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 386 (3d Cir. 2013).  “In the context of 
a Guidelines calculation error,” harmless error “means that the 
record must demonstrate that there is a high probability ‘that 
the sentencing judge would have imposed the same sentence 
under a correct Guidelines range, that is, that the sentencing 
Guidelines range did not affect the sentence actually 
imposed.’”  Id. at 387 (quoting United States v. Langford, 516 
F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2008)).  “‘High probability’ requires 
that the court possess a ‘sure conviction’” that the sentence 
would be the same, not merely an assumption that “‘places us 
in the zone of speculation and conjecture.’”  Langford, 516 
F.3d at 215 (quoting United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 
1265 (3d Cir. 1995)), 218 (quoting United States v. Conlan, 
500 F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
The proponent of maintaining the sentence—here, Raia—
has the burden of persuading a court on appeal that the district 
court would have imposed the same sentence under the correct 
Guidelines range.  See United States v. Smalley, 517 F.3d 208, 
212 (3d Cir. 2008).  It is a “rare case where we can be sure that 
an erroneous Guidelines calculation did not affect the 
sentencing process and the sentence ultimately imposed.”  
Langford, 516 F.3d at 219 (emphasis added).  Our Court has 
emphasized two ways a party might meet its heavy burden and 
fall into the “rare case” category.   
First, we may be sure that a Guidelines miscalculation is 
harmless where the district court explicitly states that it would 
have imposed the same sentence even under the correct 
Guidelines range.  Cf. Zabielski, 711 F.3d at 387–88 (“[I]t will 
usually be difficult for an appellate court to conclude with 
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sufficient confidence that the same sentence would have been 
imposed absent a clear statement to that effect by the 
sentencing judge.”); Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. 
Ct. 1138, 1347 (2016) (“Where, however, the record is silent 
as to what the district court might have done had it considered 
the correct Guidelines range, the court’s reliance on an 
incorrect range in most instances will suffice to show an effect 
on the defendant’s substantial rights.”).  However, even an 
explicit statement that the same sentence would be imposed 
under a different Guidelines range is insufficient if that 
alternative sentence is not also a product of the entire three-
step sentencing process.  See Smalley, 517 F.3d at 215; United 
States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 154 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011) (vacating 
and remanding for resentencing when district court’s statement 
in the alternative did not explain why upward departure or 
variance that would have resulted in same sentence was 
merited); United States v. Hester, 910 F.3d 78, 91–92 (3d Cir. 
2018) (vacating and remanding for resentencing despite 
“explicit statement [from the district court] that it intended to 
rectify a likely Guidelines miscalculation when imposing the 
sentence”). 
Second, we have held a Guidelines miscalculation to be 
harmless where the district court “chose to disregard the 
Guidelines as too severe in such a way that we can be certain 
that the miscalculation had no effect on the sentence imposed.”  
Langford, 516 F.3d at 218 (cleaned up); see also Zabielski, 711 
F.3d at 389 (holding error was harmless on these grounds).  Of 
course, we cannot be sure that a Guidelines error is harmless 
simply because the sentence imposed is the result of a variance 
outside both the correct and incorrect Guidelines ranges.  See 
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United States v. Welshans, 892 F.3d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(no harmless error where improper application of enhancement 
increased offense level from 37 to 39, yet district court 
imposed sentence after varying downward to offense level 34); 
United States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 124, 136 (3d Cir. 2018) (en 
banc) (remanding for resentencing where improper application 
of enhancement increased Guidelines range from 360 months 
to life imprisonment (level 42) to life imprisonment (level 43), 
yet district court varied downward to impose sentence of 240 
months).  In Zabielski, one of the rare cases where we 
determined that an erroneous calculation was harmless, we 
stressed that “what is most important is that the sentencing 
judge understands the facts . . . and incorporates them into a 
just sentence” and that it was the “District Court’s detailed 
findings of fact and explanation” that convinced us that the 
same sentence would be imposed on remand.  711 F.3d at 388. 
 Raia does not attempt to satisfy his burden under the 
first rationale because the District Court provided no explicit 
statement that it would have sentenced Raia to three months’ 
imprisonment regardless of the offense level.  Instead, Raia 
relies on the second rationale and argues that the departures 
and variances that the District Court employed to reach offense 
level 8 were completely disconnected from the Guidelines 
range calculation.  In other words, the Guidelines did not 
inform the District Court’s sentence at all because the Court 
deemed them to be too punitive.  Raia cannot satisfy his burden 
under this second rationale either. 
The first obstacle Raia faces is that the District Court 
did not follow the post-Booker three-step sentencing process, 
which requires the sentencing court to calculate, at step one, a 
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Guidelines offense level or range inclusive of any 
enhancements before, at step two, stating on the record how 
much any departure affected the offense level or range.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 308–09 (3d Cir. 
2011) (citing United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d 
Cir. 2006)).  The District Court’s elision of the two steps leaves 
us uncertain as to the extent to which the Court either departed 
or varied.  After stating that it would apply a departure for 
Raia’s charitable works, the District Court announced an 
offense level of 14—consistent with a base offense level of 12 
plus a two-level enhancement under § 3B1.1(c) plus no 
enhancement for obstruction of justice and no departures.  The 
next offense level the Court announced was offense level 8, 
which the Court reached after “vary[ing] down.”  App. 1119.  
This chain of events admits at least three interpretations: 1) 
there was no departure—or an erroneous departure of zero 
offense levels—despite the District Court’s statement that it 
would apply one; 2) there was no variance because the Court 
misspoke when announcing an offense level of 8; or 3) there 
was a downward departure of an unknown, non-zero number 
of levels applied to the offense level from which the Court then 
varied downward to level 8.  These various possibilities make 
it far from certain, if not improbable, that the Court would 
reach the same total offense level were either enhancement 
applied. 
The second obstacle confronting Raia is that the District 
Court did not provide “detailed findings of fact and 
explanation” in its analysis of the Guidelines.  With respect to 
the aggravating role enhancement, for example, the Court did 
not demonstrate that it understood all the factors supporting 
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and cutting against finding Raia to be an organizer, leader, 
manager, or supervisor.  Thus, unlike the variance applied in 
Zabielski, we cannot tell if the District Court “grasp[ed] the[] 
significance” of these factors and imposed the three-month 
sentence regardless of the Guidelines enhancements.  711 F.3d 
at 388. 
Finally, Raia points to the compassionate release he 
obtained during the pendency of this appeal as evidence that 
the District Court is highly likely to impose the same sentence 
on remand.  On May 7, 2020, Judge Martini granted Raia’s 
motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and allowed Raia to serve the remainder of 
his sentence under home confinement (but did not reduce the 
length of Raia’s sentence).  See Order, United States v. Raia, 
No. 2:18-cr-00657-WJM (D.N.J. May 7, 2020), ECF No. 91.  
But the question before the Court on the compassionate release 
motion—i.e, whether Raia’s sentence should be reduced 
because of extraordinary and compelling reasons—did not go 
to the reasons that Raia was sentenced in the first place.  
 Because there are no detailed findings of fact to review 
nor an explanation as to how the District Court reached the 
sentence it imposed, we do not regard this as the “rare case 
where we can be sure that an erroneous Guidelines calculation 
did not affect the sentencing process and the sentence 
ultimately imposed.”  Langford, 516 F.3d at 219.  Thus, the 
error was not harmless and we will remand so the District 





The District Court made multiple errors in its interpretation 
of the Guidelines that affect the calculation of Raia’s offense 
level.  Raia has not met his heavy burden to show that these 
errors are harmless.  We will vacate Raia’s sentence and 
remand to the Court for resentencing. 
On remand, it should proceed under the three-step post-
Booker sentencing process, applying any enhancements before 
ruling on motions for departure.  In deciding whether to apply 
the aggravating role enhancement, the Court should make 
explicit findings as to the number of participants in the criminal 
activity, whether Raia exercised some degree of control over 
another participant, and whether he was a “manager or 
supervisor” or “organizer or leader.”  In deciding whether to 
apply the obstruction of justice enhancement for perjury, the 
Court must “either make findings to support all the elements of 
a perjury violation, or clearly express which elements it 
believes have not been proven.”  Napolitan, 762 F.3d at 315. 
